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Closer Than “Arms Length”: Understanding the Factors Associated with Collaborative 
Contracting 
Anna A. Amirkhanyan 
Hyun Joon Kim 
Kristina Lambright 
 
This article focuses on collaborative relationships between contractors and government agencies 
and explores which contract characteristics, contractor traits, and environmental factors are 
associated with the development of such relationships. The study uses data from the Partnership 
Impact Research Project, a three-round longitudinal survey of over one hundred child care 
centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio. Our findings suggest that stronger collaborative 
contracting relationships are associated with greater contract specificity, better contractor service 
quality, and contractor affiliation with a larger organization. On the other hand, a contractor’s 
financial autonomy and nonprofit status are negatively related to collaborative relationship 
strength. We also find that a contractor’s internal management capacity is positively associated 
with the development of shared procedures governing contractual relationships. 
 
Introduction 
Holding contractors accountable for the services they deliver is a key challenge facing 
public managers involved in overseeing federal, state, and local contracts with nonprofit and for-
profit organizations (Blasi, 2002; Breaux, Duncan, & Keller, 2002; Coats, 2002; Dicke, 2002; 
Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 2002; Ott & Dicke, 2000; 
Romzek & Johnston, 2005). Public managers use a variety of different strategies while designing 
their relationships with contractors in an effort to ensure that services meet the government’s 
expectations and to minimize the likelihood of contractors’ behaving opportunistically. One such 
strategy involves fostering strong, collaborative relationships with private partners (Beinecke & 
DeFillippi, 1999; DeHoog, 1990; Sclar, 2000). Indicative of this, there is a growing recognition 
of trust and cooperation playing a key role in many public contracts (Beinecke & DeFillippi, 
1999; DeHoog, 1990; Johnston & Romzek, 2008; Lambright, 2009; Romzek & Johnston, 2005; 
Smith, 1996: Van Slyke, 2007). In the contracting literature, these types of contracts are often 
referred to as “relational.” 
As governments continue to rely on nonprofit and for-profit organizations in the delivery 
of public services, concerns about public managers’ capacity to effectively monitor performance 
still persist, and the “black box” of accountability mechanisms designed to ensure effective 
implementation of public services needs to be better understood. In particular, little is known 
about the determinants of collaborative contract governance. Scholars have detailed the service 
characteristics that are likely to be associated with the adoption of collaborative contractual 
arrangements (Amirkhanyan, 2009; Beinecke & DeFillippi, 1999; Kim, 2005; Sclar, 2000). 
However, less evidence is available on the organizational and environmental factors that facili-
tate the development of these types of contracting relationships (Van Slyke, 2009). By focusing 
on one service area, this article looks beyond service characteristics as explanations for collab-
orative contractual arrangements. Instead, we focus on contract characteristics, contractor traits, 
and environmental factors and provide insights into how these variables are related to the 
development of strong collaborative relationships between the contractor and government. As a 
part of our analysis, we examine an important debate in the contracting literature and empirically 
test whether an inverse or complementary relationship exists between collaboration and the 
degree of contract specification. 
The data for this study are from the Partnership Impact Research Project, a three-round 
longitudinal survey of more than 100 child care centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio. This 
service area is particularly well-suited for the research questions examined in this study. First, the 
lack of competition in the social service field often translates into long-term relationships forming 
between government agencies and their contractors (Johnston & Romzek, 2008; Lambright, 2009; 
Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Smith, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996). Second, in comparison to the so-
called “hard” services, such as construction, maintenance, or waste removal, outcomes in the social 
services field are harder to measure. This commonly precludes government agencies from 
specifying all of their expectations in advance of contract implementation and forces them to rely 
on cooperation and trust instead. 
We begin this article by discussing contract relationships as a means for minimizing 
opportunistic behavior of contractors. We identify several contract characteristics, contractor 
traits, and environmental factors that may be associated with the development of strong 
collaborative relationships between the government and the contractor. Following this, we detail 
our methodology and findings. This article concludes by exploring the theoretical and practical 
implications of our study for public managers pursuing collaborative approaches to contracting. 
 
Strategies for Minimizing Contractor Opportunism 
Situations in which a government agency contracts with another organization to deliver a 
public good or service are often conceptualized as a principal-agent relationship. In contracting 
relationships, the contractor, viewed as an “agent,” typically has more information about 
operations and its own capacities than the government, who is the “principal.” This situation is 
fertile ground for opportunism, a concept central to transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1975). Defined by Williamson as “a lack of candor or honesty in transaction, to include self-
interest with guile” (1975, p. 9), opportunistic behavior by contractors creates two key problems 
in principal-agent relationships: adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is a concern at 
the onset of contracting relationships and is what Arrow (1984) refers to as “hidden 
information.” It involves an agent’s propensity to misrepresent its ability to meet its contractual 
obligations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Slyke, 2007). Moral hazard, on the other hand, is a concern 
during contract implementation and is what Arrow (1984) refers to as “hidden action.” Moral 
hazard occurs when an agent exploits its informational advantage over the principal and does not 
fulfill its contractual responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sclar, 2000; Van Slyke, 2007). 
Governments are more vulnerable to contractors behaving opportunistically when the services 
being contracted have a high level of asset-specificity1 and it is difficult to measure the quality 
and/or quantity of services being delivered (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006). 
One response to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by contractors involves 
carefully detailing the terms and the procedures governing service delivery (Beinecke & 
DeFillippi, 1999; Brown et al., 2006; Sclar, 2000). However, the nature of some services and the 
administrative costs often make complete contract specification challenging (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992; Tirole, 1999). Besides, creating elaborate contracts without at the same time 
fostering trust may simply motivate individuals to come up with creative ways to game the 
system and avoid fulfilling their contractual obligations (Granovetter, 1985). 
An alternative strategy designed to minimize the possibility of contractor opportunism is 
for the government to focus on developing strong relationships by building trust and pursuing 
cooperative approaches to contract management problems (Beinecke & DeFillippi, 1999; 
DeHoog, 1990; Sclar, 2000). As Arrow points out, “It saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree 
of reliance in other people’s word (1974, p. 23).” Inter- and intraorganizational behavior theorists 
argue that transaction cost economics largely overstate the role of self-interested or rationally 
controlled behavior (Ghoshal & Insead, 1996). Organizations are not markets and often benefit 
more from cultivating shared purposes rather than by behaving opportunistically. Thus 
organizations use social control—informal strategies to create commitment and to motivate 
participants through integration of norms and by internalizing each other’s values (Ghoshal & 
Insead, 1996). 
Rather than having a principal and an agent, the government and the contractor in these 
trust-based contracting relationships are conceptualized as equal partners involved in program 
management as well as contract renewal (DeHoog, 1990). The contracting parties are willing to 
make short-term sacrifices for the partnership because they recognize that it is in their long-term 
interest to sustain the relationship (Smith, 1996). There is considerable decentralization and 
flexibility in trust-based models of contracting. The government provides contractors with a 
great deal of discretion and in many cases defers to the contractor’s expertise (Campbell & 
Harris, 1993; DeHoog, 1990), relying on common professional standards to limit opportunistic 
behavior (Bennett & Ferlie, 1996; DeHoog, 1990). Trust-based models of contracting have been 
used in a broad array of service areas including infectious disease management (Allen et al., 
2002), Medicaid managed care (Beinecke & DeFillipi, 1999), HIV/AIDS services (Bennett & 
Ferlie, 1996), foster care services (Klingner et al., 2002), early childhood programs (Lambright, 
2009), social services (Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Smith, 1996), and human waste collection 
(Kim, 2005). 
This article takes a broad approach to the “relational” aspects of contracting. Based on 
the reviewed literature, strong collaborative relationships between contractors and government 
agencies involve the following elements: (a) a shared understanding of the programmatic mis-
sion, goals, and objectives; (b) coordinated and shared operational and administrative processes; 
(c) a high level of formal and informal communication; and (d) mutual trust, respect, and cooper-
ation. A system where these aspects are present is likely to provide “social controls” (Ghoshal & 
Insead, 1996), which may guide organizational behavior. 
 
 
Factors Influencing Collaborative Relationship Strength 
The adoption of collaborative contract management strategies in the field of social 
services is not well understood. In this section, we develop several hypotheses on a variety of 
factors likely to be associated with the development of strong collaborative relationships between 
the government and the contractor. We group these factors into the broader categories of contract 
characteristics, contractor traits, and environmental conditions. 
 Contract specificity. To effectively manage contracts, the government must maintain a 
careful balance between trust and hands-on monitoring (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002). 
Opportunism may still be present in strong relationships, particularly in situations where there is 
a significant informational asymmetry between the government and contractor (DeHoog, 1990; 
Entwistle & Martin, 2005). In addition, collaborative relationships can foster a sense of 
complacency (DeHoog, 1990) and may stifle innovation if partners are unwilling to critique each 
other for fear of damaging their relationship (Entwistle & Martin, 2005). Therefore, agencies 
may choose to raise the costs of opportunistic behavior by specifying expectations and defining 
the associated rewards and sanctions. 
 In the past, contracts have been conceptualized as lying on a continuum between trans-
actional contracting at one end and relational contracting at the other end (Beinecke & 
DeFillippi, 1999; MacNeil, 1974). Transactional contracts are short-term, economic exchanges 
based on carefully detailed contractual agreements and close oversight of the provider’s com-
pliance. In contrast, relational contracts are based on open-ended, long-term exchanges in which 
personal ties and informal communication foster trust and flexible approaches to solving 
implementation problems. Consistent with this perspective, some scholars have argued that trust 
and contract specification have an inverse relationship: as trust increases, the need for formal 
contract specification decreases (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Van Slyke, 2009). By 
carefully detailing contractual terms and the procedures governing the contracting relationship, 
the government is signaling a lack of trust in the contractor (Van Slyke, 2009). Moreover, the 
initial investments in formal controls may deter the government from incurring additional 
transaction costs associated with frequent communication and the development of shared goals 
and procedures. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Contract specification is negatively associated with collaborative relationship 
strength. 
In contrast to the argument presented above, other scholars have argued that trust and contract 
specification play complementary roles (Allen et al., 2002; Deakin, Lane, & Wilkinson, 1994). 
Working together as part of the contract specification process may build trust (Allen et al., 2002). 
Contract specification may strengthen the collaborative relationship between the government and 
the contractor by reducing government concerns that the contractor will behave opportunistically 
and by reducing contractor concerns that the government will arbitrarily exercise its authority. It 
may also foster a shared understanding of processes and procedures since contractors have a 
chance to provide feedback and request clarifications on the government’s expectations 
(Amirkhanyan, 2009). Hence, formal relationships may serve as the foundation for the government 
and contractor developing stronger informal relationships. The presence of trust and contract 
specificity in contracting relationships may combine to create both “a carrot and a stick”; the 
existence of written procedures and sanctions ensures that the basic parameters of the contract are 
taken seriously, while collaborative ties and discussions may ensure that these procedures are well 
understood and well received. 
Hypothesis 1b: Contract specification is positively associated with collaborative relationship 
strength.2 
 
 Relationship length. Another contract characteristic that may be associated with a 
collaborative approach to contracting is relationship length. Trust between parties is a learning 
process (Lorenz, 1999; Vangen & Huxham, 2003) and tends to develop over time (Thomson & 
Perry, 2006; Van Slyke, 2007, 2009). Reflecting this, government officials may be more likely to 
adopt a cooperative model of contracting after several years of having a satisfactory but more 
formal relationship with a particular contractor (DeHoog, 1990). Given this, we suggest that longer 
contracting partnerships will result in stronger collaborative relationships compared to shorter 
partnerships, keeping constant the contractor’s performance during this period. Longer contractual 
relationships allow the parties to develop some familiarity with each other, promoting more 
frequent and informal communication, and a better understanding of each others’ organizational 
cultures. Longer ties also suggest parties believe that they are benefiting in some way from the 
sustained collaborative relationships which may prevent contractors from behaving 
opportunistically. 
Hypothesis 2: Relationship length is positively associated with collaborative relationship 
strength. 
 
Internal management capacity. Contractor traits are also likely to play a role in the 
development of strong collaborative relationships between the government and the contractor. 
Contractors must have enough time, staff, and expertise to implement contracts (DeHoog, 1990). 
Some contractors have skilled managers who invest their time and energy in improving the internal 
processes and optimizing service quality while other contractors lack such expertise. One might 
expect that the most skilled managers are often those who can manage not only “within” but also 
“across” organizations—building lateral communication channels, adjusting organizational 
structures, and creating common procedures facilitating program implementation. Stronger 
managers also understand the value of leadership and spend more time articulating the goals, 
framing the issues, motivating the participants and developing shared understandings with their 
partners that are essential for effective service implementation (Goerdel, 2006). Based on this, a 
contractor’s capacity to effectively manage internal relationships may translate into the capacity 
to manage external relationships as well. 
Hypothesis 3a: A contractor’s internal management capacity is positively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
It is also possible that when a contractor devotes considerable effort to internal management, 
the contractor will have less time and resources available to manage external relationships. As a 
result, collaborative relationship strength may actually decrease as internal management capacity 
increases. 
Hypothesis 3b: A contractor’s internal management capacity is negatively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
 
Contractor ownership status. Other contractor traits that may be associated with the 
development of collaborative contracting relationships include a contractor’s status as a nonprofit 
or faith-based organization. Public managers may perceive nonprofit contractors as more 
trustworthy than for-profit contractors because nonprofits are required to invest any profits back 
into their organizations and cannot distribute excess revenues to their shareholders (Hansman, 
1987). Thus nonprofit organizations may be less likely to take advantage of clients by raising 
prices or cutting costs in situations where competition is limited and service quality is hard to 
verify such as in the field of social services. Nonprofit managers are also constrained by the 
“reasonable compensation” requirement, which may result in the government viewing its nonprofit 
partners as being more mission-oriented, socially conscious, and hence less opportunistic. The 
high cost of opportunistic behavior that can jeopardize private donations and their tax exempt 
status may further deter nonprofit organizations from not fulfilling their commitments. Consistent 
with this, Van Slyke (2009) reports that public managers were initially more trusting of nonprofit 
service providers compared to for-profit service providers, and Amirkhanyan (2009) finds 
nonprofit contractors were more likely to collaborate with government agencies on performance 
measurement activities. Government agencies may also be more likely to trust faith-based 
organizations compared to their secular counterparts because of faith-based organizations’ 
emphasis on religious values. One might expect that government agencies will have stronger 
collaborative relationships with nonprofit and faith-based contractors due to the fact government 
agencies may be more likely to trust these contractors. 
Hypothesis 4a: A contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization is positively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
Hypothesis 5a: A contractor’s status as a faith-based organization is positively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
 
On the other hand, a contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization or as a faith-based 
organization may make it more difficult to develop strong collaborative relationships with the 
government. While the virtues of nonprofit organizations are widely recognized, some 
researchers point out their many pitfalls. In the absence of financial incentives to guide 
organizational leadership, nonprofit organization may be poorly managed (Hansmann,1986; 
Prager, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1986). In addition, numerous accountability pressures can result 
in dysfunctional managerial behavior (Johnston & Romzek, 1999). Despite the assumptions of 
the socially responsible nature of nonprofit organizations, they may prioritize different service 
delivery norms than public organizations: while governments may emphasize equal access to 
services, nonprofits may prioritize responsiveness to more limited community groups 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Government may be less 
likely to trust nonprofits based on these considerations. It may also be challenging for faith-based 
organizations to effectively collaborate with government agencies because of their strong 
emphasis on religious values. The legal constraints imposed by the government agencies on the 
way in which public dollars may be spent within a faith-based organization (e.g., the restriction 
on proselytizing while delivering public programs) can complicate interorganizational ties and 
discourage a nonprofit from being fully transparent. Thus, if the religious values of a faith-based 
organization are not fully consistent with the government’s goals, the relationship between the 
faith-based organization and the government may suffer. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: A contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization is negatively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
Hypothesis 5b: A contractor’s status as a faith-based organization is negatively associated 
with collaborative relationship strength. 
 
Contractor service quality. Trust results in a relationship when the parties involved have a 
history of successfully completed transactions (Lambright, Mischen, & Laramee, 2010; Lorenz, 
1999; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Van Slyke, 2007). Poor or 
unremarkable performance may naturally be associated with shorter contracts, but in some 
markets it may not be possible to impose the ultimate sanction—contract termination—for a 
variety of reasons including lack of contractor competition, lack of funding for service 
improvement, or poor performance measurement mechanisms. In cases where contract 
termination is not an option, one may expect the government to be less likely to develop strong 
informal ties with contractors who have not met the government’s service delivery goals. On the 
other hand, government agencies may be interested in maintaining closer relationships with high 
performers to sustain good program outcomes and perhaps to collect information on their best 
practices for dissemination to other contractors. Contractors delivering high quality services may 
also seek stronger collaborative relationships with the government in an effort to highlight the 
superior quality of their services compared to other service providers. Hence, we expect there to 
be a positive association between contractor service quality and collaborative relationship 
strength. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Contractor service quality is positively associated with collaborative rela-
tionship strength. 
Contractor size. A final contractor characteristic that may be associated with the adoption of a 
more collaborative approach to contract management is organizational size. Bigger contractors 
may benefit from economies of scale and have more institutional capacity to be collaborative with 
government agencies. 
Hypothesis 7a: Contractor size is positively associated with collaborative relationship strength. 
 
It is also possible that contractor size will be negatively related to collaborative relationship 
strength. Organizations often collaborate to obtain the resources needed to achieve their goals 
(Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Fleishman, 2009; Whetten & Leung, 1979). Smaller contractors 
are likely to be less financially secure and more reliant on their contracts. Therefore, they may 
work harder on building collaborative relationships with government agencies. Smaller contractors 
are also less likely to have formally written, institutionalized procedures pertaining to 
communication, and hence these organizations may use a more informal communication style. 
Hypothesis 7b: Contractor size is negatively associated with collaborative relationship strength. 
 
Financial autonomy from the contracting government agency. In addition to contract 
characteristics and contractor traits, a contractor’s external ties to their environment are likely to 
be associated with the development of collaborative contractual arrangements. Like smaller 
organizations, organizations that receive substantial funding from other government sources are 
likely to be less dependent on their contract as a critical revenue source and may be willing to 
invest less time and effort into their relationships with the government to ensure they are 
successful. As a result, we expect that these types of organizations will have weaker collaborative 
relationships with the contracting government agency. Consistent with this prediction, 
Amirkhanyan (2009) finds that contractors that were less financially dependent on their contracts 
were less likely to collaborate with government agencies in the process of performance monitoring. 
Hypothesis 8: Financial autonomy from the contracting government agency is negatively 
associated with collaborative relationship strength. 
 
Affiliation with a larger organization. Another environmental factor that may be 
associated with collaborative relationship strength is a contractor’s affiliation with a larger 
organization. The government agency may be more likely to presume that the contractors 
affiliated with larger organizations have the capacity to deliver high quality services because of 
the benefits they receive from economies of scale. As a result of this confidence, governments 
may be more willing to make investments in their relationships with these contractors. In 
addition, contractors that already have ties with a parent institution may have more institutional 
capacity to be collaborative and hence may be able to work more effectively in partnership with 
the contracting public agency. 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Contractor affiliation with a larger organization is positively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
It is also possible that contractors not affiliated with larger organizations will have stronger 
collaborative relationships with government agencies. These contractors may be less financially 
secure and more reliant on their contracts. As a result, unaffiliated contractors may have more 
incentive to invest time and energy in their relationships with government agencies. 
Hypothesis 9b: Contractor affiliation with a larger organization is negatively associated with 
collaborative relationship strength. 
Influence of client groups. Finally, the presence of influential client groups may be associated 
with the development of weaker collaborative relationships between the contractor and 
government. Powerful client groups can serve as another mechanism for monitoring the services 
that contractors deliver. Brown and Potoski (2006) find that the government may adjust the extent 
of its monitoring in cases when the contractor is also monitored and evaluated by a third party. 
Client groups can pressure contractors to improve service quality and be responsive to their needs. 
Hence, the government agency may be able to reduce the extent of its own monitoring. Under such 
conditions, the communication between the government and the contractor will also be minimized 
and that, in turn, can hinder the development of trust-based relationships (Bohnet & Huck, 2003; 
Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Gulati, 1995; Lambright et al., 2010). 




To examine the factors associated with the development of collaborative relationships 
between contractors and government agencies, this study focuses on partnerships developed by 
local Head Start agencies in Ohio. Started in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty, Head Start 
provides comprehensive child development programming to preschool children of low-income 
families. The overall goal of this initiative is to improve school readiness among low-income 
children. Head Start programs are located throughout the country and are supported by both federal 
and state funding. In Ohio, local Head Start agencies have received state Head Start funding to 
develop partnerships with local child care centers. 
Data. This study uses data from the Partnership Impact Research Project.3 This is a three-
round survey exploring early education partnerships between local Head Start agencies and child 
care centers in Ohio. The survey was implemented in the spring and winter of 2002 and in the 
summer of 2003. The surveys are longitudinal, but the same respondents were not necessarily 
surveyed during every round. For our analysis, we have used three of the six data sets comprising 
the Partnership Impact Research Project. They are as follows: 
1. The Child Care Center Data Set contains information on nonprofit and for-profit child 
care centers. The data is provided by the center directors and focuses on the population 
served, services, funding sources, and other major characteristics of contractors. Some 
child care centers included in this data set have a partnership with a local Head Start 
provider in Ohio, while others do not. 
 
2. The Child Care Center Partnership Data Set contains information on the child care 
centers’ contracts with a local Head Start agency in Ohio and focuses on various aspects 
of these contractual relationships. This partnership-level data set has information on a 
subsample of the centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set mentioned above. 
 
3. The Parent Data Set includes information collected from parents on the services their 
children have received and their satisfaction with the service quality. This is parent-level 
data, and thus it includes responses of several parents whose children attended the 
centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set. 
Each file represents pooled time-series data with up to three survey records for each child 
care center (or each partnership). First, the Child Care Center Data and the Partnership Data were 
merged using center ID numbers and wave indicators. At this point, the centers from the Child 
Care Center Data that were not involved in a Head Start contract were dropped from our analysis. 
We then modified the parent level data set listed above as No. 3. This data file was used to provide 
information on parents’ assessments of center quality. Thus, using the Parent Data, we computed 
an average parent-rated quality indicator for each center. Next, we merged this center-level 
information with the first two data sets, resulting in 163 records. Finally, we used a variety of 
strategies to deal with the observations with missing values for any of our independent and 
dependent variables.4 The final data set which we used in this analysis contained 96 records, each 
describing a nonprofit or a for-profit child care center and its partnership with a local Head Start 
agency. 
Employing the combined data set, we tested the proposed model using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression to estimate the effects of individual independent variables on collaborative 
relationship strength holding all the other independent and control variables constant. Due to the 
structure of the data—an unbalanced panel data set with several observations for each child care 
center—an individual child care center can appear multiple times in our data set, and the obser-
vations for these types of child care centers will not be independent of each other. To address 
concerns about potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we also tested the proposed 
model using clustered robust standard errors. 
Dependent variables. Appendices 1 and 2 provide information on how all variables are 
operationalized and measured. For our dependent variable, we created a set of variables 
measuring different aspects of collaborative relationship strength between a government agency 
and a contractor perceived by the contractor. Specifically, the variable shared procedures reflects 
the existence of procedures—not necessarily formally recorded—which govern the contractual 
relationship and are acknowledged by both parties. These include the use of various processes to 
explain the nature of the Head Start program to staff, to prepare staff for their responsibilities, to 
ensure staff understands Head Start regulations, and to manage finances. This variable is the 
mean of eight survey items measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (see Appendix A). The vari-
able goal agreement reflects contractors’ perception regarding the extent to which both parties’ 
agree on contract goals. This is the mean of responses for four survey items indicated in 
Appendix A. Among other things, this variable is intended to represent the extent to which there 
is a shared philosophy or a vision of the curriculum and educational approaches. The variable 
communication quality—the mean of three survey items listed in Appendix A—measures 
whether or not the child care center directors believe they have good communication with their 
public partners. More specifically, this variable reflects the contractors’ perception that their 
voice is heard and that their input will be welcomed by the Head Start agency. Finally, 
cooperation in contract implementation is the mean of five survey items describing cooperative 
strategies used by the two parties involved in the contract. In particular, it reflects the 
contractors’ perception of being “a full partner” and perceptions of being treated “with respect.” 
We tested the reliability of the scales for these four variables using Cronbach alphas. The 
resulting alpha scores range from .787 to .898, which exceed the minimum acceptable threshold. 
We further conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of these four variables. The result indicates 
that they can be combined into a single measure of collaborative relationship strength.5 We 
created this aggregate measure by calculating the mean of the four variables described above. 
Independent variables. The coding procedures for creating all independent variables are 
explained in Appendix B. There are two independent variables that represent contract character-
istics. The first variable is contract specificity. We computed the sum of eight dichotomous sur-
vey items to measure whether there is a written legal agreement and other formally recorded 
documents detailing contract implementation procedures. The other independent variable that 
represents a contract characteristic is relationship length. Some scholars have viewed relation-
ship length and strength as essentially synonymous (Campbell & Harris, 1993; Macneil, 1974; 
Smith, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996). However, we believe that contract length is distinct from its 
strength—it is a separate factor that may or may not determine the strength. We measure rela-
tionship length as the number of years that a child care center has engaged in a partnership with a 
particular local Head Start Agency in Ohio. 
We operationalize contractor traits using several variables. We measure internal 
management capacity reported by contractors themselves using the sum of seven survey items. 
This variable is based on the number of times someone in a managerial position performed various 
administrative functions such as “observing teachers in the classroom to assess their practice” and 
“meeting with teachers to provide feedback regarding their teaching practices in the classroom.” 
To reflect organizational ownership, we created two dummy variables: the first variable indicates 
whether the organization is a nonprofit rather than a for-profit organization, and the second 
variable indicates whether the contractor is a faith-based rather than a secular organization. Two 
variables measure organizational size: average daily enrollment of preschoolers at a center and a 
center’s total annual operating budget. 
As a final contractor trait, we measure contractor service quality using three different 
indicators. As our first measure of child care service quality, we include an objective measure of 
agency performance in our data analysis. The Partnership Impact Research Project data set 
includes data on the number of regulatory violations documented during the latest state licensing 
inspection conducted by government quality inspectors. This is a negative measure of service 
quality: lower values suggest better quality. In our sample, the values of this interval-ratio vari-
able range from 0 to 49. 
Similar to performance measures used in several recent studies (e.g., Brewer & Coleman, 
2000; Chun & Rainey, 2005; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Selden & Sowa, 2004), our two other 
measures of service quality are subjective. In the survey, respondents—child care center 
directors—were first asked to provide detailed background information on various aspects of their 
centers’ performance and then were asked to share their overall satisfaction with the quality of 
their center. Specifically, the following survey question was used: “How satisfied are you with the 
overall quality of your center?” There were five possible response categories: very satisfied (5), 
somewhat satisfied (4), neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (3), not very satisfied (2), or not satisfied 
at all (1). We also included a measure of child care center quality based on data collected from 
parents. We created an ordinal variable based on the following question: “In general are you 
satisfied with the quality of these services you get? (1 = not at all, 2 = not very, 3 = somewhat, 4 
= very).” Parents were asked this question after discussing the specific services that their family 
received. We computed an average center-level rating for this question using the parent-level data 
for each center and included this in our center level analysis. 
Due to their subjective nature, director and parent satisfaction with a child care center may vary 
as much by the personality, education, and experience of the respondent as by the center’s actual 
performance. This concern is minimized considerably for the parent-rated satisfaction measure 
because it is an average based on data collected from multiple clients of each center. While our 
subjective measures of service quality have their limitations, scholars agree that it is possible to 
develop valid, reliable, and sensitive subjective measures of organizational performance (Brewer, 
2006). An advantage of using employee and parent self-reports to measure performance in addition 
to the data on “violations” is that the reports provide a global measure of performance and are able 
to capture both output and outcome-based criteria (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005). 
A contractor’s external ties to the environment are measured in three different ways. We 
measure financial autonomy by the total number of funding sources received by an organization. 
We summed the number of positive responses to the questions regarding whether a contractor 
receives funding from eight different sources (federal Head Start, state Head Start, state pre-
school subsidies, parent tuition/fees, United Way funding, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s 
Child and Adult Care Food Program, private foundation funding, and other funding). Having a 
greater number of funding sources indicates that the contractor is more autonomous from the 
local Head Start agency. In addition, we created a dichotomous variable referred to as affiliation 
with a larger agency to indicate whether a center is part of a larger agency or an umbrella organ-
ization. Finally, we measure the influence of client groups using a dummy variable to indicate 
whether a child care center provides opportunities for parents to participate in an advisory group. 
 Besides the independent variables, we include seven control variables in our model. To 
measure teacher quality at each center, we use the proportion of teachers with a bachelor’s or 
master’s degree. We also measure the supply of teachers in a child care center using the student-
teacher ratio reported by each center. Furthermore, we include the percentage of each center’s 
preschool teachers receiving training annually. To control the effect of geographical location, we 
include a dichotomous variable indicating whether a contractor is located in a rural area. In 
addition, we control for the characteristics of a center’s client population by including the 
percentage of White preschoolers in our regression analysis. Finally, since the data set was 
collected from three survey waves, we added two dummy variables indicating each survey wave. 
Limitations. There are some limitations with this study’s data and research design. First, 
the data describing the relationships between the government agencies and the contractors, our 
dependent variables, were provided by the contractors rather than by the government agency or 
both parties. Thus these variables reflect the contractors’ perceptions and are subjective.6 While 
there is a possibility of a positive bias in the contractors’ reports, this bias is likely to be 
systematic and should not compromise the analysis (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005). Another 
limitation of this study is that the sample size for our analysis is 96 child care centers. As a 
result, our models may have low statistical power. Finally, our data is based on child care 
partnerships in a single state. This limits the generalizability of this study because of the multiple 
factors that vary across states and are not captured in this analysis such as cost of living 
differences and child care policies.7 Furthermore, we focus on a single service area with 
outcomes that are difficult to measure. The findings of this analysis will therefore be more 
applicable to similar social services such as elderly care where customers are typically unable to 
judge quality and less generalizable to other types of services. Replications of this study in other 
locations and service areas can help verify our findings. 
 
Findings 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variables both from the full data set with 163 
observations as well as from the reduced data set with 96 observations after dropping those 
records with missing values. We tested whether there is a statistically significant difference in 
the means of the variables between the full sample and the reduced sample. The two-tailed test 
results show that there is no statistically significant difference between sample means except for 
parent-rated quality. In our reduced sample, 45 centers are nonprofit contractors (47%) and 12 
centers are faith-based organizations (13%). The breakdown of the centers by wave is as follows: 
37 centers appeared in Wave 1 (39%), 34 centers participated in Wave 2 (35%), and 25 centers 
are included in Wave 3 (26%). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 




158  3.667  0.832  1.400  5.000 -0.291  
96  3.700  0.900  1.400  5.000 
Shared procedures 158  3.187  0.946  1.000  5.000 -0.102  
96  3.200  1.002  1.000  5.000 
Goal agreement 158  3.878  0.919  1.000  5.000 -0.358  
96  3.922  0.966  1.000  5.000 
Communication 
quality 
158  3.789  0.970  1.000  5.000 -0.427  




158  3.815  0.981  1.400  5.000 -0.151  
96  3.835  1.051  1.400  5.000 
Independent variables 
Contract characteristics 
Contract specificity 163  6.399  1.648  0.000  8.000 -0.355  
96  6.473  1.602  0.000  8.000 
Relationship length 163  3.051  1.660  0.063  9.087 -0.274  
96  3.112  1.770  0.063  9.087 
Contractor traits 
163 29.808 31.744  0.000 185 -1.261  
Internal management 
capacity 
96 35.392 35.883  3.900 185 
Nonprofit 163  0.466  0.500 0  1 -0.047  
96  0.469  0.502 0  1 
Faith-based 163  0.172  0.378 0  1 1.045  
96  0.125  0.332 0  1 
Contractor service quality 
Director-rated 
satisfaction 
163  4.239  0.852  1.000  5.000 -1.792  
96  4.417  0.721  2.000  5.000 
Parent-rated quality 125  3.418  0.317  2.429  3.944 3.723
a 
 
96  3.203  0.493  2.000  5.000 
Number of violations 131  8.298  8.213 0  49 0.520  
96  7.729  8.095 0  49 
Contractor size 
Number of students 163 32.938 18.816 6 135 -0.022  
96 32.989 17.234 7 100 
Contractor’s budget 
(natural log) 
163 12.704  0.738  8.006 15.654 -0.137  
96 12.718  0.824  8.006 15.654 
Environmental conditions 
Financial autonomy 
from the contracting 
agency 
163  4.503  1.288  1.000  8.000 0.269  
96  4.458  1.305  1.000  7.000 
Affiliation with a 
larger organization 
163  0.436  0.497 0  1 0.298  
96  0.417  0.496 0  1 
Influence of client 
groups 
163  0.583  0.495 0  1 -0.828  
96  0.635  0.484 0  1 
Control variables 
Human resource capacity 
Teacher quality 163 17.810 23.950  0.000 100 -0.505  
96 19.480 26.659  0.000 100 
Teacher training 163 97.566 12.624  2.000 100 -1.852  
96 99.482  2.988 75.000 100 
Student-teacher ratio 163  9.564  2.574  2.000 15.000 -1.213  
96  9.971  2.627  4.000 15.000 
Contractor in rural area 163  0.172  0.378 0  1 0.103  
96  0.167  0.375 0  1 
% of White 
preschoolers 
163 53.036 36.632 0 100 -0.081  
96 53.422 37.081 0 100 
Wave 2 163  0.288  0.454 0  1 -1.089  
96  0.354  0.481 0  1 
Wave 3 163  0.233  0.424 0  1 -0.483  
96  0.260  0.441 0  1 
a. p value = .0008. 
 
We measure the strength of collaborative relationships using five measures as explained in 
Appendix A. The mean scores of the four subdimensions of collaborative relationship strength in 
our reduced data set range between 3.200 and 3.922, suggesting that childcare center directors 
have relatively positive perceptions of their relationships with local Head Start agencies. In par-
ticular, goal agreement had the highest rated mean score and shared procedures had the lowest. 
Communication quality and cooperation in contract implementation show similar levels of 
strength: their mean scores are 3.844 and 3.835, respectively, which is considerably higher than 
the mean score of shared procedures, 3.200. This result may suggest that the contractors and the 
government agencies often agree on the vision, goals, and philosophy of child care provision and 
have the capacity to effectively communicate and promote partnership-oriented behavior. How-
ever, developing specific, mutually understood procedures to ensure that everyone is involved in 
the contract management may be less prevalent. 
Applying the five different measures of the dependent variable, we tested the proposed 
hypotheses. The first model utilizes our aggregate measure of collaborative relationship strength 
as the dependent variable, while the remaining four models investigate the relative impact of 
independent variables on the four specific dimensions of collaborative relationship strength: goal 
agreement, communication quality, cooperation in contract implementation, and shared 
procedures. Table 2 shows the estimation results for our OLS and clustered robust standard errors 
models.8 
Providing support for Hypothesis 1b, contract specificity is significant in all 10 regression 
models. Contrary to the arguments by some scholars, the degree of formalization in contract 
implementation is not negatively associated with the formation a good relationship between the 
contractor and the government agency. Specification of contract parameters occurs in tandem 
with the development of shared procedures, establishment of common goals, effective communi-
cation, and cooperation in contract implementation. Thus well-specified contracts and perhaps 
the efforts devoted to developing them seem to foster strong collaborative relationships between 
the contracting parties.9 
Another important contract characteristic—relationship length—is positively associated 
with cooperation in contract implementation in our clustered errors model. This finding suggests 
that contractors are more likely to cooperate in the implementation of long-term contracts. 
However, relationship length is not statistically significant in any of the other models, suggesting 
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Faith-based 0.200 0.200 0.102 0.102 0.652 0.652 -
0.423 


























0.690* 0.623* 0.623* 
Number of 
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-0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
Contractor’s 
budget 
0.019 0.019 -0.008 -0.008 0.018 0.018 -
0.008 





































































-0.011* -0.008 -0.008 
Teacher 
training 
0.049 0.049** 0.01 0.01 0.064 0.064*
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-0.042 -0.019 -0.019 
Contractor in 
rural area 
0.301 0.301 0.531 0.531 0.445 0.445 0.198 0.198 0.032 0.032 
% of White 
preschoolers 
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 
Wave 2 -
0.031 
-0.031 0.002 0.002 0.052 0.052 -
0.223 










-0.738* -0.292 -0.292 
Intercept -
4.936 






-3.970 -7.853 -7.853* 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R
2













4.35*** 2.90*** 5.78*** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Two of the three environmental variables play an important role in explaining variation in 
the dependent variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, financial autonomy is negatively associated 
with relationship strength. This result confirms our hypothesis that contractors with diversified 
funding streams have fewer incentives to invest their resources in developing strong collaborative 
relationships with government agencies and is consistent with Amirkhanyan (2009). However, 
these results should be interpreted cautiously. We measure financial autonomy using the number 
of funding streams a contractor receives. Perhaps, a better measure of the concept, not available 
for this research, would involve assessing the ratio of the contractor’s budget coming from Head 
Start funding compared to the contractor’s total budget. The positive and significant association 
between affiliation with a larger organization and collaborative relationship strength suggests the 
importance of contractors’ external ties in contract implementation and confirms Hypothesis 9a. 
Contractors affiliated with larger parent organizations develop stronger collaborative relationships 
with government agencies. In particular, they establish more shared procedures, reach greater 
agreement on contract goals, and have contracts that involve greater cooperation in their imple-
mentation. On the other hand, we fail to find support for Hypothesis 10 as our third environmental 
variable, the presence of parent advisory groups, is not statistically significant. 
Three contractor traits have signification associations with either our aggregate measure of 
collaborative relationship strength or some of its submeasures. While a contractor’s internal 
management capacity does not have a significant association with overall collaborative 
relationship strength, it has a positive association with the development of shared procedures. This 
result provides partial support for Hypothesis 3a and suggests that contractors whose leaders are 
more skilled and active in internal managerial tasks are also more effective in detailing the 
procedures to manage the contingencies of contract implementation in cooperation with their 
public counterparts. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, nonprofit child care centers are less likely than their for-
profit counterparts to develop strong collaborative relationships with local Head Start agencies. 
Nonprofit status has a negative association with collaborative relationship strength when 
collaborative relationship strength is measured by our aggregate measure, shared procedures, 
goal agreement, and cooperation in contract implementation. 
We also find partial support for Hypothesis 6. Service quality, as evaluated by parents 
whose children attend the child care centers, has a positive relationship with every aspect of 
collaborative relationship strength identified in this study. According to our OLS results, a one-
unit increase in the average parent satisfaction with the child care center is associated with a .725 
unit increase in the center’s overall collaborative relationship with the local Head Start agency. In 
addition, another service quality measure based on data provided by child care center directors is 
positively associated with all five aspects of collaborative relationship strength (except shared 
procedures in our clustered errors model). Thus collaboration in contracting increases as client and 
contractor satisfaction grows. However, we fail to find support for an association between the 
number of licensing violations committed by the child care center and collaborative relationship 
strength. It appears that trust between the contractor and government agency is sensitive to service 
recipients’ satisfaction with the service as well as the contractor’s own confidence with the service 
quality but is not associated with a more objective service quality measure, the frequency of 
licensing violations. 
We do not find any support for Hypothesis 5a, 5b, 7a, or 7b. Neither faith-based 
ownership status nor contractor size is significantly associated with any of our measures of 
collaborative relationship strength. In addition, most of the control variables included in the 
regression analysis do not have significant associations with collaborative relationship strength. 
One exception is teacher quality. The quality of teachers measured by the percentage of the 
teachers who hold BA or MA degrees is negatively associated with some of our collaborative 
relationship strength measures: aggregate collaborative relationship strength (in our ordinary 
least squares [OLS] model only), goal agreement, and communication quality. We also find that 
teacher training has a positive association with aggregate collaborative relationship strength (in 
our clustered errors model only), goal agreement (in our clustered errors model only), and 
cooperation in contract implementation. 
 
Discussion 
The objective of this article is to understand the factors associated with the development of 
collaborative contracting relationships. We view the collaborative or “relational” aspects of 
contract implementation broadly. Our conceptualization includes joint efforts and practices to 
ensure that the contractor shares the same vision and philosophy as the government, has a voice 
and feels respected in the implementation process, and understands all the expectations, 
regulations, and procedures. The primary finding of this study is that the development of detailed 
contracts and collaborative contracting arrangements play a complementary role in contracting 
relationships, rather than having a negative association, as it was often suggested in the past. Our 
research indicates that collaborative contracting arrangements are often used in tandem with legal 
agreements and documents that formally prescribe contractor roles, responsibilities, procedures, 
and actions. Thus what has been viewed as a dichotomy may, in fact, represent two important and 
parallel practices in contract management. 
These results challenge the assertions by some scholars that trust is associated with less 
formal contract specification (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). We find that as contract 
specification increases, contracting relationships actually become stronger as measured by goal 
agreement, communication quality, cooperation in contract implementation, and the development 
of shared contracting procedures. If this is the case, there may be greater transaction costs 
associated with the contract specification process when strong collaborative relationships 
develop between the government and contractor rather than fewer costs. At the same time, strong 
collaborative relationships may still be associated with fewer transaction costs during the con-
tract implementation process as a result of greater alignment regarding service delivery goals and 
expectations. Our results shed light on the process of developing strong interorganizational rela-
tionships: they suggest that contract specification may serve as a necessary foundation on which 
actual relationships are built and improved. Hence, while contract specification requires capacity 
and effort, this investment appears to have a positive effect on the more intangible aspects of 
relationships: understanding, shared values, and respect. 
We find limited evidence that relationship length is positively associated with the develop-
ment of collaborative contracting relationships. There is some evidence indicating contractors are 
more likely to cooperate in a contract’s implementation as the length of the contract increases. 
This result is generally consistent with past research, which suggests that trust develops over time 
(Thomson & Perry, 2006; Van Slyke, 2007, 2009). 
Our findings are particularly interesting in the light of earlier research on the effect of time 
in contracting relationships. A recent article by Yang, Tzung, and Hsieh (2009) explores the effect 
of different government capacity measures on various performance indicators. They observe that 
the impact of some of these capacities is moderated by the passage of time. For instance, the 
positive effect that agenda-setting and evaluation capacities have on performance declines with 
time, while the benefits of implementation capacity actually grow over time. If we view our 
dependent variables, broadly, as indicators of “collaborative capacity” in government contracts—
something that may eventually help improve the contractors’ performance—our study may con-
tribute to this discussion. Rather than exploring how time can moderate the effect of some 
governments’ capacities on performance, our study helps understand whether these capacities 
grow or decline over time. In fact, we find that time matters for whether subjects believe they are 
respected, they are full partners, and their partnerships are fully established (our measures of 
cooperation in contract implementation). Thus time helps build child care center directors’ emo-
tional comfort and the feeling of being trusted and respected in these relationships. Time, however, 
did not contribute to the other aspects of collaborative capacity: goal agreement, communication 
quality, and share procedures. Our findings confirm the conclusion of Yang and colleagues (2009) 
that contract managers and researchers should adopt a long-term perspective on government 
contracting and expect some capacities to be more prevalent and more important for performance 
in the course of contract implementation. 
Another important finding of our study is that parents’ and child care center directors’ 
satisfaction with service quality is associated with stronger collaborative contracting 
relationships.10 This may suggest that contractors that are effective in their core activities 
establish closer partnerships with their monitoring agency. Thus past organizational performance 
may be an important clue for public officials involved in the contractor selection process. On the 
other hand, we do not find a significant association between our third measure of service quality, 
the frequency of licensing violations, and any of our measures for strong collaborative 
relationships. Perhaps, the nature of these violations may explain these findings. The number of 
licensing violations in our regressions measures child care centers’ compliance with health and 
safety regulations. Some of these violations may be determined by the condition of the facility, 
equipment, or other similar factors. Such problems may arise irrespective of the partnership 
strength and, in and of themselves, may not have an effect on relationships. In cooperative 
relationships, we would expect these problems to be resolved in the spirit of full partnership by 
openly acknowledging them and establishing a plan of action. In less cooperative relationships, 
more formal compliance-based tools may have to be used. Our findings suggest that regulatory 
performance problems not only do not bring partners closer together but also do not draw them 
apart. In addition, as is frequently the case with objective measures of performance, the number 
of licensing violations may simply not be comprehensive enough to capture important 
dimensions of child care center performance (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006). 
In addition, we find that a contractor’s internal management capacity is associated with the 
development of shared procedures in contracting relationships. Some child care center directors in 
the sample were active in observing their teachers in the classroom, providing feedback, discussing 
how the curriculum satisfies the developmental needs of children, and reviewing program data to 
make improvements and track the attainment of organizational objectives. Regression analysis 
suggests that these directors were also more likely to work on building strong collaborative 
relationships with government agencies. Specifically, they were more likely to work on developing 
procedures to ensure that staff has a good understanding of Head Start, there are processes for 
resolving conflicts, and staff is involved in all phases of the partnerships. Our findings suggest that 
the same organizational managers who work effectively within their organizations tend to work 
effectively across organizational boundaries. 
Our study also indicates that nonprofit organizations are less likely to maintain collaborative 
relationships with government agencies. We suggest two possible explanations. First despite the 
many virtues ascribed to nonprofit organizations, public managers may be increasingly aware of 
their problems including financial abuses and unethical behavior (Arenson, 1995; Grimaldi & 
Trescott, 2008; Reaves, 2001), the lack of management capacity and the absence of factors to 
“discipline” dysfunctional managers in small noncompetitive markets (Hansmann, 1986; Johnston 
& Romzek, 1999; Prager, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1986), nonprofits’ ability to apply political 
pressures on local governments for increased service rates (Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Smith & 
Smyth, 1996), and, in some subsectors, nonprofits’ propensity to limit their service to the more 
affluent clients (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008). Furthermore, a recent study analyzed contract 
monitoring practices across nonprofit and for-profit contractors (Amirkhanyan, 2010). This study 
found that while public managers consider contractors’ ownership status unimportant in their 
work, managers working with nonprofit contractors in fact used a different set of performance 
measures, and some respondents reported being especially cautious of the vendors’ nonprofit 
status. These factors may explain the lower levels of collaborative relationship strength with 
nonprofit organizations in our study. 
A second plausible explanation is that the data on collaborative relationships we used 
were obtained from the vendors. Thus we find that nonprofit organizations perceive their 
partnerships with the government to be less collaborative than their for-profit counterparts. This 
may reflect higher expectations of and a propensity toward collaborative activity by the nonprofit 
providers. The for-profit organizations may be more likely to view their contracts with 
government agencies as business transactions and not expect to share service delivery 
philosophies, or be seen as a “full partners” in the relationship. 
While we find that contractor size by itself does not matter, financial and organizational 
autonomy have a significant impact on the development of strong collaborative relationships. In 
our study, contractor affiliation with a larger institution is positively associated with collaborative 
relationship strength. Our results also indicate that contractors with fewer funding sources have 
stronger collaborative relationships with their public partners. Our data preclude us from knowing 
how the private contractors were formed, which may have helped in the interpretation of this 
finding. In fact, some contractors could have been formed (or significantly expanded) in response 
to a specific contract opportunity. Being “the creatures” of government action in the past, these 
organizations would have stronger informal ties at the onset of the contract and can be expected to 
invest more time and effort as the relationship progresses. In such cases, it is also reasonable to 
expect some level of staff transitions across sectors (e.g., cases of government managers 
transitioning from the public sector to the private sector but still maintaining strong ties with the 
public agency). On the other hand, the contractors with multiple sources of funding are less likely 
to have an inherent link to a specific government agency and are therefore more likely to be 
independent. 
Our findings on financial and organizational autonomy have important implications for 
contractor selection. They suggest that public managers should carefully consider a contractor’s 
other partnerships when selecting a vendor and strategically evaluate how important the contract 
is for a specific contractor. In addition, a contractor’s other partnerships should be considered at 
the contract implementation stage. Public managers who place a high value on establishing col-
laborative contracting relationships should recognize that they may need to spend more time and 
effort building partnerships with contractors that are not affiliated with larger umbrella organiza-
tions and with contractors that are more financially autonomous. 
One important limitation of our analysis suggests a fruitful direction for the future research. 
Our data allow us to observe the end result rather than the process of developing strong col-
laborative or highly formalized relationships. Thus we do not know if more specific contracts were 
developed jointly or if the Head Start agencies unilaterally set the standards and the processes for 
the contractors, which eventually improved the contractors’ relationships with their agencies. For 
instance, we know that some contracts involved “a document that describe[d] procedures for 
communication,” but we do not know if the document was developed jointly. Past research 
suggests that some contractors negotiate the rules, regulations, and standards at different points in 
the course of contracting, while other contractors accept the standards unilaterally developed by 
the government agency (Amirkhanyan, 2009). Understanding these “process-related” aspects of 
contracts can have important implications for the practice of contract management. 
This study provides insights into the organizational and environmental factors associated 
with stronger collaborative relationships between governments and their contractors. Contract 
management and implementation, however, is a complex process. Aside from the quality of 
contractual relationships, numerous factors may be associated with programmatic outcomes. 
Such factors include the contractors’ service delivery and management capacity, sufficient 
resources, characteristics of the client population, market conditions, quality of performance 
measurement procedures and data, and many others. The ultimate task—pursued by the authors 
of this research in a follow-up study—is therefore to disentangle the association of relationship 
design and other factors with organizational performance. Our data set has several interesting 
and distinct measures of performance that make it possible to separate performance from 
relationships by utilizing the assessments of multiple independent constituencies. If this future 
study finds relationships indeed matter, the findings of this current study may provide 
practitioners with valuable information on the factors that influence their development. 
Appendix A 
Survey Items for Dependent Variables 
Variable Items used to create each variable 
Collaborative relationship 
strength (aggregate) 
Mean of four variables created below: “shared 
procedures,” “goal agreement,” “communication 
quality,” and “cooperation in contract 
implementation” 
Shared procedures Mean of the following survey items measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = not at all, 2 = not very, 3 = neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat,5 = very much so) 
Cronbach α = .898 The partnership between my child care center and 
Head Start has . . . 
1. Process for ensuring child care staff have a good 
understanding of Head Start 
2. Process to ensure staff understand Head Start 
regulations 
3. Procedures for resolving conflicts or differences 
across your Programs 
4. Ensured that child care staff are prepared for their 
new responsibilities 
5. Ensured that all staff are involved in all phases of 
partnerships 
6. Procedures to keep children in the program if their 
parents lose eligibility for child care subsidy 
7. Procedures to keep children in the program if their 
parents lose eligibility for Head Start services 
Procedures to manage finances as part of the 
partnership 
Goal agreement Mean of the following survey items measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale 
Cronbach α = .874 1. The partnership between my child care center and 
Head Start has a shared partnership philosophy and 
vision 
2. The partnership between my child care center and 
Head Start has agreement about 
curriculum/educational approach 
3. The partnership between my child care center and 
Head Start has agreements or plans that help guide 
the partnership work 
4. My center and Head Start have similar goals for 
our work together 
Communication quality Mean of the following survey items measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale 
Cronbach α = .787 1. The partnership between my child care center and 
Head Start has good communication within and 
across your organizations 
2. I feel my voice is heard in the Partnership 
3. I feel I can pick up the phone and call the Head 
Start program 
Cooperation in contract 
implementation 
Mean of the following survey items measured on a 
5-point Likert-type scale 
Cronbach α = .825 1. Individuals involved in the partnership between 
my child care center and Head Start demonstrate 
mutual respect for one another 
2. I feel my program is a full partner with the Head 
Start program 
3. I feel the Head Start program respects my 
Program 
4. I feel Head Start does not really view my center as 
a partner (reverse coding) 
5. How would you characterize your partnership 
with Head Start on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = just 
forming and 5 = fully established 
Appendix B 
Survey Items for Independent Variables 
Variable Items used to create each variable 
Contract characteristics 
Contract specificity Sum of the following survey items measured as 
dichotomous nominal variables: 
1. Currently do you have a written legal agreement or a 
contract with Head Start? 
2. Do you regularly update the document? 
3. Does this agreement specify the maximum number of 
children who can receive Head Start enhanced services 
at your center? 
4. In your partnership with Head Start, do you have a 
written document that describes roles and 
responsibilities of Head Start and of people at your 
center in providing services?  
5. Do you have any documents that describe the 
partnership’s goals and specific actions that the 
partnership plans to take to achieve the goals? 
6. In your partnership, do you have any written 
documents that state what your program needs to do to 
meet Head Start Program Performance Standards? 
7. Do you have documents describing procedures for 
communicating with your Head Start partner? 
8. Do you have a well-defined process for recruiting and 
enrolling children into your center for Head Start 
enhanced services? 
Relationship length Number of years that the center has engaged in the 
partnership 
Contractor traits 
Internal management capacity Sum of seven dichotomous survey items: 
Please indicate the average number of times someone in 
an administrative role at your center, such as an 
education coordinator, administrator, or senior teacher, 
engages in the following activities during a typical 
month. 
1. Observes teachers in the classroom to assess their 
practice. 
2. Meets with teachers to provide feedback regarding 
their teaching practices in the classroom. 
3. Meets with teachers to discuss how to link the 
curriculum to children’s developmental needs. 
4. Discusses with teachers strategies to ensure teaching 
practice is developmentally appropriate. 
5. Discusses with teachers strategies to ensure a literacy-
rich curriculum. 
6. Reviews teachers’ teaching. 
7. Reviews program data to see how the center is doing 
compared to specific goals or objectives. 
Nonprofit contractor Is your center a nonprofit or for-profit organization? 
(coded as 1 for nonprofit organizations and 0 for for-
profit organizations) 
Faith-based contractor Is your center a faith-based organization? (coded as 1 for 
positive answers) 
Contractor service quality 
Director’s satisfaction “How satisfied are you with the overall quality of your 
center?”1 = not satisfied at all, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 
= neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat 
satisfied, 5 = very satisfied 
Parent-rated satisfaction Mean score of parents’ responses from one center to the 
following question, “In general, are you satisfied with 
the quality of these services you get?” (1 = not at all, 2 
= not very, 3 = somewhat,4 = very) 
 
Number of violations Number of violations documented during state licensing 
inspections 
Contractor size 
Number of students What is the average daily enrollment of preschoolers? 
(numeric) 
Contractor’s budget What is your child care center’s current total annual 
operating budget? (numeric) 
Environmental conditions 
Financial autonomy from the 
contracting agency 
Total number of funding streams 
Does your center or agency access the following funding 
sources to provide services to preschoolers and their 
families at your child care center? (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1. Federal Head Start 
2. State Head Start 
3. State Preschool Subsidies 
4. Parent tuition/fees 
5. United Way funding 
6. USDA CACFP 
7. Private foundation funding 
8. Other funding 
Affiliation with a larger organization Is your center part of a larger agency or umbrella 
organization? (coded as 1 for positive answers) 
Influence of client groups Does your center provide opportunities for parents to 
participate in an advisory group? (coded as 1 for 
positive answers) 
Control variables 
Human resource capacity 
Teacher quality Percentage of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree or a 
Master’s degree 
Teacher training Percentage of teachers receiving training annually 
Student-teacher ratio What is the ratio of preschoolers to teachers or teaching 
aides at your center? 
Contractor in the rural area Survey item “urbanicity” (1 = urban, 2 = suburban, 3 = 
small town,4 = rural; coded as 1 for small towns and 
rural areas and 0 for other responses) 
% of White Preschoolers Percentage of white preschoolers served by a center 
Wave 2 Survey wave 2 (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
Wave 3 Survey wave 3 (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
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Notes  
1. Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the physical infrastructure, technology, and 
knowledge and skills needed to produce a particular service can be used in the production 
of other services. 
2.  In addition to trust, contract specification is likely to be related to a variety of other 
factors including the complexity of the contracted service.  
3. . The formal title of the data set is ICPSR04298-v1, 2001-2004.  
4. There were less than five missing cases in any of the relational design variables, and we 
imputed means (the means and the medians had similar values). The variable measuring 
the number of violations had32 missing cases, and since this number is substantial we 
removed all missing cases from our analysis. The variable measuring directors’ 
satisfaction with the center had only one missing case, and we imputed the mode to retain 
that case in our analysis. The proportion of missing cases among control variables was 
well below 5%, and we imputed average or mode values.  
5.  We conducted a factor analysis to confirm the measurement model for collaborative 
relationship strength using the principal component analysis method. Varimax rotation 
method was applied. Following the Kaiser criterion, we dropped the components with 
eigenvalues under one (Dunteman, 1989). According to the resulting correlation matrix, 
there is only one component with eigenvalue greater than one. Those dropped 
components’ eigenvalues range from 0.258 to 0.392. This result confirms that the four 
measures of collaborative relationship strength validate the single factor structure. The 
produced factor loadings for the four measured variables are “shared procedures” (0.844), 
“goal agreement” (0.886), “communication quality” (0.881), and “cooperation in contract 
implementation” (0.878).  
6.  It would be ideal if the relationship strength variables reflected both the contractors and 
the Head Start agency perspectives. The Partnership Impact Research Project does 
include the Head Start Partner Survey that measured Head Start directors’ perspectives on 
their partnerships with contractors. However, matching the responses from the center 
directors with the responses from the Head Start directors caused a significant loss of 
data. For the sake of the statistical power of our data set, we decided not to use the Head 
Start Partner Survey data for this study.  
7. Nonetheless, focusing on one state does help us keep constant the state-level variation in 
such policies, which may reduce concerns regarding spuriousness.  
8.  Due to potential reverse causality issues with many of our independent variables, we 
discuss our findings in terms of correlation rather than causation.  
9. As a sensitivity analysis, we ran a model exploring whether a reciprocal relationship 
exists between contract specification and relationship strength. The results of this 
sensitivity analysis are generally consistent with the estimation results presented in this 
article. 
10. We have conducted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis by using human resource 
capacity variables (teacher quality, teacher training, and student-teacher ratio) as 
instruments for parent-rated service quality. We find that contract specificity and 
affiliation with a larger organization are still significant, but most other variables lose 
their significance. We also tested a model where we use the same instruments for 
director-rated service quality. The results show that contract specificity and nonprofit 
status are still significant. 
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